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n the occasion of his retirement from teaching, a Festschrift
was organized to celebrate the scholarly work of Brian
Gerrish. In his response, Gerrish confesses: "The theologian in me has always been convinced that there cannot be a theology
without a secure concept of revelation, while the historian in me whispers back that revelation is in serious trouble and has been since the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." 1 Behind this insecurity surrounding Christian revelation is the hermeneutical question of whether God
can be present to an individual or humanity while remaining Other. Martin Luther, living before the period of time referred by Gerrish, is a theologian who has stressed that God is present in human life. At the same
time, Luther has purposely complicated the relationship between the
sign and meaning so that God always remains Other in communication
with humanity. In fact, this part of Luther's hermeneutic has led many to
inquire whether Luther's writings had an active role in the creation of the
present western secularized culture. 2 This question, outside the focus of
this paper, is one that has occupied recent Luther-scholarship and leads
in several conflicting directions. 3 At the same time, in opposition to the
assumptions of modern western culture, it is of central importance to
Luther whether one lives in the presence of God or not. 4 This combination, where Luther prevents revelation from becoming an expression of
the "same" and insists that human beings live in the presence of God,
makes Luther a theologian who is most helpful for western Christianity at
the beginning of the twenty-first century.
This article will show that Luther's theology and concept of revela-
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tion, centred on the proclamation of the "Gospel, "5 is one that is able to
talk about the presence of God in a believer's life while keeping God
wholly Other. The relevance of this for the Christian mission at the beginning of the twenty-first century will become evident by noting some
parallels between Luther's hermeneutic and some of the concerns raised
in recent critiques of the western metaphysics of presence. A representative example is provided by Jacques Derrida, who also wants to
complicate the relationship between sign and meaning for the sake of
the otherness of the other. John D. Caputo affirms that for Derrida:
'This delimination of reference is motivated not by subjectivism or scepticism but by a kind of hypersensitivity to otherness, by a profound vigilance about the other of language and of the possibility of something
different, something 'impossible. '" 6
Luther's "hermeneutic of suspicion" was directed against any expression of transcendence used to give ultimate meaning to human accomplishments, works, and morality in the face of the darkness and threat of
the future, human guilt, and the limits of the will. Luther makes it clear
that, when faced with the God of the proclamation of the "Gospel," there
is no secure place from where the interpreter can interpret the signs of
God's presence and activity. 7 Luther disallows the use of reason, moral
projects, being, the human will, and even holiness as categories by which
human beings might construct a hermeneutic to unify human experience.8 In the "Gospel," the various attempts to create identity, righteousness, and "eternity" are replaced with the "Other," Jesus Christ.
Robert W Jenson claims that western civilization has heard the "Gospel's" attack on idolatry without believing in Christ's gifts and so now
faces nothingness. 9 In the aftermath of this intellectual and moral attack
on transcendence, theology has changed so that it often becomes an
expression of anthropology. Faith has no object but rather is urged because it is variously valued to be good for healthy, moral, or confident
living. 10 David S. Yeago writes: "This has, moreover, been true for 'liberal' and 'conservative' Protestants alike. Protestants have tended to assume that the real object of faith is the fact of our being forgiven and
accepted, rather than Jesus Christ himself, apprehended as true God
and true human being. "11 In this nihilistic vacuum, there has arisen a
fascination with language as a possible replacement of the gods of the
West. 12 The ground for interpretive security is sought in humanity's ability to communicate with the other. However, since the holocaust, there
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has been a loss in confidence that the great narratives of the last two
centuries might be able to provide a moral basis for society. 13 An awareness has arisen that instead of revealing, language is a tool for hiding. 14
Elie Wiesel eloquently captures this loss of confidence:
Today it's different....Like the Shekinah, Divine Presence, language has
followed Israel into exile. What does exiled language mean? It refers to
the distance between words and what they mask... .In every modern
country one witnesses this verbal inflation, and a resulting devaluation of
words. Political parties "war" with each other, industrial enterprises
launch "offensives," ... On another plane, Stalin built the Gulag to "reeducate" his citizens and Lavrenty Beria (Soviet Intelligence chief during
Stalin's regime) annihilated hundreds of thousands of people for the
"salvation" of humanity; as for Hitler, he invented the terms
"concentration camp" and "final solution," and all for the "well-being" of
the human race. 15

According to Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard, this postmodern rebellion against
language has also occurred at other times in western civilization. 16 Luther
is also one who had practiced such a rebellion in his context and because of that, Luther's hermeneutic is one that can prove helpful to Christian theology today. 17
God's Speaking

In the cross and resurrection of Christ, God actively and effectively
speaks to create believers. God's Word in Christ Jesus is a performative
Word that effects what it says. Thus, as God's speaking created the
heavens and the earth, God's Word of Absolution effects absolution.
Luther insists:
In Holy Scripture, however, there are real blessings. They state facts and
are effective. They actually bestow and bring what the words say. We
also have blessings of this kind in the New Testament through Christ's
priesthood, which is our blessing when I say: "Receive the absolution of
your sins." ... All these things have the power to grant you forgiveness
immediately and truly if you believe, for they are not our works; they are
God's works through our ministry. Accordingly, they are not blessings
that express wishes; they are blessings that have the power to bestow.
When I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the
Holy Spirit, it is just as if I were saying: "I am snatching you from the
hands of the devil and bringing you to God, and I am doing this truly and
in fact." 18
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Luther talks about the proclamation of the cross of Christ in a way that is
a critique of reason, human experience, and all"what's in it for me" calculating philosophies. 19 Luther claims that all attempts at finding God
by interpreting the signs through reason and experience will actually result in an increase in sin. For Luther, these interpretive strategies will be
governed by the desires and wishes of a self-centred interpreter who now
identifies these desires with God. Luther was convinced that such selfcreated gods will eventually violently turn on the interpreter by creating a
despair manifested as hypocrisy, self-righteousness, or self-hatred. This
violence will be also manifested outwardly in one's relationships with others. God's speaking gives blessings and are not a reflection of human
wishes.
At the end of the twentieth century, there has been a different kind of
revolt going on against some of these same assumptions. For instance,
Emmanuel Levinas distinguishes between what he calls the "Said" and
the "Saying" so that the active address of and to the Other can never be
made into a function of the Same. 20 The Said, which turns everything
into part of the Same, is what can be said about the Other or can be the
discourse which defines the Other by giving the parameters of what is
reasonable or consistent with experience. Similarly, Jacques Derrida has
recognized the inherent violence of a hermeneutic which either defines
oneself by the other or the other by oneself. 21 John D. Caputo claims
that there is a positive relationship between Levinas' distinction between
the Said and the Saying and Derrida's negative theology. 22 For Derrida,
there is a world of difference between speaking to someone and speaking about someone. 23 This becomes clear in his analysis of Nietzsche's
statement:
"Friends, there are no friends!" cried the dying sage;
"Enemies, there is no enemy" shouts the living fool that I am. 24
This pithy quotation, reveals the difference between talking to friends
and enemies and talking about them. When talking about them, they
are no longer there: "One speaks of them only in their absence, and
concerning their absence. "25 This is true even when such friends and
enemies are physically present.
For Luther, what can be said about God in theology must never be
confused with what God actively and creatively says to us in the proclamation of the "Gospel." Otherwise, theology becomes a new "Law."
Violence is done to God and others as one's own agendas for salvation
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are projected onto God. God and one's neighbour are ordered into a
scheme for establishing one's own righteousness, identity, and salvation. Talking about God does not effect salvation and righteousness.
Theology is a second-order discourse and should not be confused with
the encounter with God in the proclamation of the crucified and risen
Christ. Luther safeguards against the expressions of such a tradition of
immanence by talking about Christ as the Word spoken by God outside
us (extra nos). The righteousness that Christ gives is always an "alien"
righteousness (iustitia Christi aliena). Luther insists that a believer is
simultaneously righteous and sinful (simul iustus et peccator) precisely
because Christians encounter a Christ who is "alien" to them. 26 When
one is drawn to trust in the Other who is Christ, such a believer is completely holy, righteous, and blessed because of Christ. At the same time,
when the same person is examined for signs of righteousness according
to a list of categories designed to measure attributes or behaviour, one
will either find nothing "good" or find a righteousness, which by definition, is a self-righteousness. The presence of the "alien" Christ cannot
be understood in such a way that Christ becomes "possessed" by the
believer. Christ remains other even while making the believer blessed by
his presence. Luther's hermeneutic, by insisting that Christ's righteousness remains "alien" and that the Word is spoken extra nos, is a radical
critique of such a philosophy of immanence. 27
Alterity

Luther, after introducing a distinction between a general and particular knowledge of God, shows why these two should not be confused. He
is convinced that just about everybody has a general knowledge of God
which includes the affirmations that God exists, that God created the
world, and that God is good. Luther, however, is also persuaded that
such general knowledge of God has limited or no value. The reason for
this lies in the awareness that an intricate knowledge of God and the
world does not reveal anything about God's intentions for us: "For it is
written (Romans 3:11): 'No one understands God'; and elsewhere (John
1: 18): 'No one has ever seen God,' that is, no one knows what the will of
God is. Now what good does it do you to know that God exists if you do
not know what His will is toward you?" 28 God is not available or "at hand"
for the "grasping" of human knowledge. It is God who ensures that no
towers of Babel can be built to reach heaven gloriously. In fact, Luther
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makes "the startling claim that the trinitarian God is 'hidden' precisely in
his revelation, that God's hiddenness is a wilful act within the economy
of salvation. "29 As part of the revelation itself, God actively hides from
humanity so that God can communicate a particular knowledge of God
in Christ Jesus. Luther identifies this particular knowledge as one that is
passive: "As a matter of fact, our knowing is more passive than active;
that is, it is more a matter of being known than of knowing. "30 Luther
continues by explaining that being known by God means: "You have
been visited by the Word; you have been granted faith and the Holy Spirit,
by whom you have been renewed." 31
Luther's hermeneutic describes what takes place in the encounter
with Christ in the proclamation of the "Gospel." This encounter creates
faith and the fear of the Lord which is the beginning of knowledge and
wisdom. Oswald Bayer has shown that there is an inherent connection
between Luther's description of the vita passiva and his understanding
of godly knowledge as that which is gained from sapientia experimentalis
rather than scientia. 32 Being known by God in Christ Jesus is not the
same as gaining knowledge of things "at hand." Nor can it be equated
with knowledge of the self where consciousness or the mind becomes
an object of inquiry. According to Luther, this passive and particular
knowledge of Christ implies that: "you must hear Him and not master
Him or prescribe method, goal, or measure to Him. "33
This knowledge of Christ is one that is directed to us particularly. It is
a passive knowledge that, nevertheless, delivers us from the terrors of
the Law:
"... Thus day by day I can become stronger and surer against the terrors
of the Law, till I finally become master of the Law and sin through full
confidence in Thy mercy." This is the teaching of this psalm and our
perpetual school, from which we never graduate as perfect masters,
neither we nor the Apostles nor the Prophets. We all remain students
here, as long as we live, we all ask to be washed thoroughly. 34

That God is the active One in this proclamation of the "Gospel" is the
death knell to a human reason which examines and judges experience in
order to find salvation:
Human reason is easily offended by the ugly shape of the cross. It
regards as insane those who try to comfort, help, and care for others, or
who boast about their great riches, righteousness, power, and victory
over sin, death, and every evil, and about their happiness, salvation, and
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eternal life - when meanwhile these same people are needy, weak,
sorrowful, and despised, and are mistreated and killed as enemies of the
state and of religion .... 35
The passivity of Luther's "particular" knowledge of God prevents the
cross and the "Gospel" from becoming principles for building theories
concerning knowledge and reality. Even a godly focus on the womb of
Mary and the death of Jesus on the cross can become subverted into
new "theologies of glory" when turned into the building blocks for constructing models for mastering history and reality. For example, Hegel's
attempt to make the Christian proclamation of God's powerlessness on
the cross into a principle of reality turns Luther's "theology of the cross"
into a "theology of glory. "36 Such a project changes the proclamation of
the cross and resurrection of Christ from being an announcement concerning God's gifts to a scheme by which one can order life's moral
undertakings. Luther's identification of the "particular knowledge" of
God in Christ Jesus as God knowing us prevents the use of his theology
for such expressions of immanence. 37 Luther is aware that in the face of
life's trials, temptations, and sufferings it is not enough to align our
thoughts with some divine attribute or principle. As David S. Yea go points
out, for Luther, Christian comfort is not a thought:
Thus Luther can make the odd-sounding remark that when tribulation
comes, "a comfort is necessary, not a thought." "Comfort" theologically
considered is therefore not at all the same thing as "a subjectively
consoling thought." On the contrary, the "comfort" of the believer is
Christ himself.... 36
Christ must reveal by his actual speaking to and for us and cannot be
found by human seeking. In Luther's hermeneutic, Christ must reveal
and is not immanently located in some aspect of human life.
Emmanuel Levinas is one postmodern thinker who has judged western thought's "long adventure with immanence" to be "violent. "39 A symptom of this violence is that it undercuts the possibility of a God who
actively reveals from the outside. This concern resonates with Luther's
hermeneutic. Adriaan Peperzak summarizes Levinas' revolt against western use of immanence:
In any case, the project of Western philosophy has excluded the
possibility of ego's transcending itself toward a God who would be
absolutely other and irreducible to any element or to the whole of the
universe. Under the name of God, the philosophers, as did the
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theologians, built many idols [italics mine], as for example Logos, Esse
ipsum, Substance, Nature, or Spirit, but a God neither known or
preknown, nor concealed in the unconscious or preconscious memory
of conscience, a God who must reveal in order to be accepted -such a
God is impossible within the traditional framework. 40

Levinas describes the encounter with the Other as an encounter with
an infinity that cannot be reduced to an "ideal of reason," thereby becoming a projection of a beyond which completes the incomplete. 41 To
describe this encounter, Levinas has purposely chosen the face of the
other as that which confronts us. Unlike a text or other work of culture
the face resists being made into a phenomenon, symbol, or mask. 42 It
resists the narcissistic efforts of the self to get behind the sign and, according to Levinas, the face claims responsibility from the one it confronts. As Levinas states, the implication of this transcendence calling
us to responsibility is that we are in a passive position concerning Goodness: "This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the
Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good chose me before I
can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice. "43
Levinas chose the face to talk about the encounter with the other
and that he did so because it best resists attempts at representation. In
doing this, Levinas carefully avoids a hermeneutic which becomes an
archeology to get past the face-to-face encounter. The face gives the
transcendent a recognizable content, thereby saving human beings from
an unlimited desire for transcendence. Such a desire would only consume the one desiring. 44 Luther expressed a similar concern by using
the distinction between the "hidden" and the "revealed" God. God hides
so that the revelation of God will always be "dressed and clothed in His
Word and promises. "45 The encounter with God will be through Christ,
the mask of God:
The Gentiles speak with God outside His Word and promises, according
to the thoughts of their own hearts; but the Prophets speak with God as
He is clothed and revealed in His promises and Word. This God, clothed
in such a kind appearance and, so to speak, in such a pleasant mask,
that is to say, dressed in His promises- this God we can grasp and look
at with joy and trust. 46

The attempt to go past this mask is the attempt to view God "absolutely"
and rise to heaven through one's own speculationsY According to Luther,
this "naked God" eventually turns on us and crushes us with our own
despair.48 At the same time, such a "naked God" causes trouble for
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misfortune begins in the name of God. "49

The concern for the alterity of the other expressed throughout the
writings of major postmodern thinkers is one that is also a priority with
Luther. The difference is that Luther's hermeneutic is shaped by trinitarian
and christological considerations. Luther's hermeneutic constantly directs attention away from the self toward the God who speaks in Christ
Jesus:
I refuse to look at anything except this Christ. He should be such a
treasure to me that in comparison with Him everything else is filthy. He
should be such a light to me that when I have taken hold of Him by faith,
I do not know whether there is such a thing as Law, sin, or
unrighteousness in the world. 5°

It is in this light that one can understand Luther's criticism of the scholastic assertion that faith does not justify the sinner unless it is "formed
by love." 51 Luther calls faith, itself, a gift from God which precludes it
from being immanently formed by human love for others. A faith "formed
by love" asks: "What have I done? Where have I sinned? What have I
deserved?" 52 Instead, faith created by God looks away from the self toward Jesus, asks what Jesus has done, and so draws the self out of itself.
Created by the proclamation of the "Gospel'' which announces redemption from sin, eternal death, and the devil in Christ, faith has its gaze
directed outside itself to Christ. 53
The Gift of God

Being drawn out of oneself is experienced as a violence against one's
autonomy. Luther was not only convinced that God's speaking in the
proclamation of Christ Jesus goes against what can be learned from
experience but also goes against what human beings want or will for
themselves. Thus, the creation of faith will necessarily entail experiences
of Anfechtungen. These intense experiences of temptation and trial arise
from the saving encounter with this Other called Jesus. Jesus interrupts
the sinful self's attempts at establishing itself over against others. The
encounter with Jesus Christ in the proclamation of the "Gospel" undermines all projects for self-creation and self-redemption while giving redemption in Christ. Luther's hermeneutic undermines modern confidence in the human will.
The sinful self, curved in on itself, believes that it can make choices
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which, in its very choosing, has power redemptively to transcend itself.
Modernity has taken the power of choice and has made it the locus of
infinity and freedom. Friedrich Schiller philosophically examines the
moment before a decision is made and the limitless possibilities become
a particular reality. He defines this moment as an infinite space where
there is human freedom and a free will which is not empty but is filled
with the content of an aesthetic freedom. 54 In opposition, Robert Jenson
once again claims that this metaphysic of pure possibility is a result of
the western world hearing the promises of the Gospel while emptying
those promises of Christ. Jenson writes:
If the gospel, which asserts this God, is true, then this futurity is really
there, and we must expect that when the gospel calls our attention to it,
it will be noticed also by those of us who do not come to obey the gospel.
To such notice, unbounded futurity must present itself as the child's
nightmare of eternity, in which at every moment there is always yet
another moment, so that no journey can have a goal, no pain a
termination, no joy a resting place, into which the meaning of every
temporal act and sequence evaporates. If infinity is not the infinity of
God, it must be the infinity of the world, that is, nothingness .... lnsofar as
the call of infinity has been an actual historical phenomenon in the
West...radical faith and nihilism have repeatedly and with increasing
urgency posited themselves as our only choices. 55
Luther, many years before Schiller, also examined the moment of
decision and came to radically different conclusions from those assumed
by dominant western society. Luther is convinced that "the will cannot
change itself and turn in a different direction. "56 One cannot get behind
one's own will in order to change what one wants. Therefore, Luther
describes the human will as either being raptured by God or enslaved by
the devil. In Luther's own day, Erasmus of Rotterdam posited a neutral
place from which the will could either move toward evil or the good.
Luther identifies the inherent nihilism of such a theory by calling such a
"will to nothing" a dialectical fiction. He traces this speculation back to
Origen's theory of the soul as a neutral place between Spirit and flesh: "I,
too, am familiar with Origen's fable about the threefold disposition of
flesh, soul, and spirit standing in the middle and being capable of turning either way, toward the flesh or toward the spirit.. .. Paul here calls everything flesh that is without the Spirit.. .. "57 For Luther, this theoretical proposition of an abstract will is an attempt to storm the very gates of heaven. 58
It attempts to be like God who creates ex nihilo: "For the power of apply-
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ing itself to salvation cannot be a merely abstract willing, unless salvation
itself is to be called nothing. Nor again can desire and endeavour be a
merely abstract willing, since desire must strive and endeavour in some
direction .... "59
Luther insists that it is the God who speaks in Christ Jesus who is the
active one in salvation and that this Word is always spoken pro me or pro
nobis. Referring to Galatians 3:13, where St. Paul says that Christ became a curse for us (huper hanon), Luther confesses: "... but He is a
divine and human Person who took sin, the condemnation of the Law,
and death upon Himself, not for Himself but for us. Therefore the whole
emphasis is on the phrase huper hanon. " 60 The "Word" is spoken to
particular people at particular times. The "Word" is not passively available for insightful human searching or willing. That the "Word" is spoke
pro nobis theologically ensures that God is the active party in salvation
and gives the Christian message an existential focus and prevents it from
becoming a theological abstraction.
Luther's existential focus, therefore, is different from the popular existentialism of the twentieth century. For those who face an indifferent
universe, existing in time which ends in death, there can be no meaning
to one's decisions and actions apart from the meaning one gives to oneself or receives from others. 61 Such an existential expression follows
Luther's critique of the various attempts at making God abstract. However, at the same time, it does not hear the active voice of God which
proclaims love. Identity and meaning are created by the self which "leaps"
into this emptiness and, in so doing, creates its own meaning.62 In opposition to this, Luther insists that meaning, identity, and salvation are
given by God in the Word, Jesus Christ.
Nevertheless, the faith created by this "Word" is also a "leap" because, for Luther, God remains hidden within this proclamation. The
"particular knowledge" of God is proclaimed under the cross. The love,
mercy, promise, and faithfulness of God are proclaimed under its opposite, namely, the crucified Son of God. This prevents love, mercy, promise, and faithfulness from becoming abstractions that become appropriated by aligning one's life to these values. The "Word" spoken under the
cross is not a divine lecture about righteousness but is God's active rescue mission of humanity. The "hiddenness" of God in the cross is not
based on a division between Spirit and flesh which identifies flesh with
material things. For Luther, God's "hiddenness" is not a statement about
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humanity's dependence on the senses and reason. 63 Against this possibility, Luther contends: ·~ctually the opposite is true. The Spirit cannot
be with us except in material and physical things such as the Word, water, and Christ's body and in his saints on earth. "64 God actively "hides"
so that God can be active in the proclamation of Jesus Christ.
In Luther's theology, the "hiddenness" of God is not a function of
humanity's finitude, but is a result of God's active mission that curtails
human attempts at reaching God. God, who alone is righteous, will not
be reached by human attempts at establishing their own goodness or
"goods." For Luther, all pretenses of righteousness are undermined by
the "Law" that is never fulfilled or satisfied. 65 This use of the "Law" prevents the neighbour from being used as a path to God. Luther's understanding of the positive use of God's "Law" places us firmly in the presence of the "other" who is our neighbour and the "Other" who is God.
Such an understanding undermines the seeking of righteousness, freedom, and salvation through the realization of personal autonomy.
In this sense, Luther's theological use of the "Law" mirrors the concerns of the postmodern Emmanuel Levin as. Adriaan Peperzaks argues
that Levinas' delineation of the alterity of the Other calls into question a
freedom defined as autonomy:
In turning to the alterity of the Other, I discover that my freedom is called
into question; the Other's appearance reveals the injustice of my
monopoly. If, by the shock of this encounter, the I seeking domination
discovers itself to be unjust, this discovery is not a quality added to the
preliminary existence of an innocent and neutral freedom but rather the
beginning of a new way of existing and being conscious of myself and
the world. The original state is not that of an ego enjoying its isolation
before it would meet others; from the beginning, and without escape,
the Same sees itself related and linked to the Other from which it
separated, and it is unable to escape from this relationship. 66

The Other lays claim to one's life. In fact, western culture's "long adventure with immanence"is an attempt to protect itself from such claims.
We have experienced and still fear the tyranny of the Other, whether it
takes the form of the tyranny of the One or the Many. 67
For Luther, the fear of the Other, whether experienced as the threat
of God or the threat of the neighbour, will lead to a nihilistic despair apart
from the resurrection or promise of the "Gospel." With the proclamation of the "Gospel" both neighbour and God become gifts given to the
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believer. The "Gospel" proclaims the righteousness of Christ and thus
gives believers freedom to love the neighbour and God:
To become circumcised, therefore, is a characteristic of slavery. But to
love one's neighbour is a characteristic of freedom, because the former
is done under the threat of the Law by those who are unwilling, while the
latter is done by those who are willing out of love that flows freely and
gladly. 68
Luther's positive use of the "Law" is grounded on the "otherness" or
alterity of Christ, God's "Word":
Therefore Moses, together with Paul, necessarily drives us to Christ,
through whom we become doers of the Law and are accounted guilty of
no transgression. How? First, through the forgiveness of sins and the
imputation of righteousness, on account of faith in Christ; secondly,
through the gift and the Holy Spirit, who creates a new life and new
impulses in us, so that we may keep the Law also in a formal sense.
Whatever is not kept is forgiven for the sake of Christ. 69
Oswald Bayer claims that it is the hermeneutical function of the a-

liena iustitia of Christ which places Luther's theology in sharp contrast
with modern thought. Bayer continues by saying that the relationship of
the "same" to the "other" is decisive and that, in this regard, Luther's
hermeneutic mirrors Emmanuel Levinas' recent critique of modern assumptions. Bayer writes:
Damit ist der entscheidende Streitpunkt im Konflikt reformatorischer
Theologie mit neuzeitlichem Denken bezeichnet. lndem ihn die
Theologie ins Auge faJ3t, muJ3 sie auf ihre Weise das Verhaltnis von ison
und heteron bestimmen, das in der philosophischen Tradition seit
Platon im Sinne der monarchischen Vernunft gefaJ3t wurde und nun von
Emmanuel Levinas, der gegen diese Tradition die ,Anderheit" (alterite)
scharf betont, neu bearbeitet wird. 70
Luther's hermeneutic, which directs theology to talk about the presence of God in the proclamation of the Crucified One, is very different
from the metaphysics of presence of Greek philosophy. God, in the
proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Christ, speaks to and for
the ungodly. There is no perspective from which the "godly" might judge
that God is here or there. An analogy is provided by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in physics. The theory suggests that there is no place by
which one can judge the position and velocity of particles. Similarly, there
is no neutral place from which one can view and determine God's pres-
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ence either. 71 It does not help to affirm that God is everywhere because,
according to Luther, that is simultaneously to say that God is also nowhere:72 "... you will run back and forth throughout all creation, groping
here and groping there yet never finding, even though it is actually there;
for it is not there for you. "73 According to Luther: "There is a difference
between [God's] being present and your touching. "74 Instead, God speaks
a saving Word to the ungodly. Theological statements that say "there it
is" return to Aristotelian logic. Instead, for Luther, theology functions to
"drive" the church back into the wilderness where the "Gospel" is proclaimed with tears, passion, and suffering. 75 In that "Gospel" God speaks
to and for us, giving us salvation in Christ Jesus.
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